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THE INCOHERENCY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE NEED
FOR FEDERAL STANDARDS
Timothy De Lizza*
INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 2006, Chairman Christopher Cox of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced that the SEC
would propose extensive revisions to its current rules relating to
executive compensation.1  These rules are now enacted.2
“Over the last decade and half,” Cox said in his speech, “the
compensation packages awarded to directors and top executives
have changed substantially.  Our disclosure rules haven’t kept pace
with changes in the marketplace, and in some cases disclosure ob-
fuscates rather than illuminates the true picture of compensation.”3
He added that the rules were “about wage clarity, not wage con-
trols . . . [because] the SEC lacks statutory authority to impose sal-
ary caps on corporate executives and we’d be out of bounds to
attempt that through indirection.”4
The problem of executive compensation, however, far exceeds
disclosure.  It involves substantive unfairness of the wages that ex-
ecutives receive, the process used to set their wages, and the incon-
sistent regulation of corporate governance.5  Cox’s suggestion that
the SEC’s mandate will not allow it to set wage controls explains
his silence on these matters.6  The SEC, however, already sets wage
controls, both directly and indirectly.7
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Fordham Law School, 2008; Baccalaureate, Earlham
College, 2002.  The author would like to thank Professor Paul Washington for his
assistance in preparing this Comment.
1. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Chairman’s Opening Statement, Proposed
Revisions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan.
17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm; see also
Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Propose Changes to Disclosure Requirements
Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (Jan. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-10.htm.
2. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg.
53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 232, 239, 240, 245, 274).
3. Cox, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See infra Parts I-III.
6. Cox, supra note 1.
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C.A, § 7243 (West 2007).
1111
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Less clear is whether these controls go beyond the SEC’s man-
date and to what extent new rules could regulate executive com-
pensation.  This may mean that the SEC’s new rules are an
overcautious attempt to stay within its mandate, and will lead to
ineffective rulemaking.
This Comment suggests that the U.S. Congress should expand
the SEC’s mandate so that it has clear authority to implement cor-
porate governance standards.  Part I provides an overview of
problems regarding how much executive pay is given, how pay is
set, and how it is disclosed.8  It then highlights regulatory responses
to those problems, including how they provide contradictory incen-
tives and result in unpredictability and over-regulation.9  Part II
considers the current scope of the SEC’s mandate, including
courts’ and commentators’ difficulty in defining its boundaries.10
Part II concludes that this difficulty sometimes makes the SEC’s
regulatory actions either ineffective or beyond its mandate.11  Part
III looks at the SEC’s recently enacted executive compensation
rules and concludes that as a result of the SEC’s mandate, the rules
will not fix the problems set out in Part I.12  Last, Part IV argues
that the U.S. Congress must expand the SEC’s mandate to enable
the SEC to set federal corporate governance standards, and to al-
low it to effectively regulate executive compensation.13
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DEBATE
Critics of current executive compensation standards have made
three broad complaints relating to executive compensation: the pay
is too high, the process currently in place for setting compensation
is flawed, and executive compensation is poorly disclosed.14  Regu-
latory responses to these problems have created mixed results, and
in some cases, arguably worsened the problem.15  Additionally, the
many official and unofficial regulatory bodies sometimes provide
contradictory incentives that result in unpredictability and over-
regulation.16
8. See generally infra notes 14-81 and accompanying text.
9. See generally infra notes 82-153 and accompanying text.
10. See generally infra notes 154-209 and accompanying text.
11. See generally infra notes 154-209 and accompanying text.
12. See generally infra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
13. See generally infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
14. See generally infra notes 17-81 and accompanying text.
15. See generally infra notes 82-153 and accompanying text.
16. See generally infra notes 82-153 and accompanying text.
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Pay is Too High
Adjusted for inflation, the pay of the average worker remained
almost flat at $27,000 from 1990 to 2004, while average Chief Exec-
utive Officer (“CEO”) pay rose from $2.82 million to $11.8 mil-
lion.17  Thus, CEOs now receive about four hundred times the
salary of low-ranking employees.18  This problem affects small to
mid-sized companies, as well as larger ones.19
Compensation of CEOs at two thousand of the biggest U.S.
companies increased thirty percent in 2004, compared with fifteen
percent in 2003 and nine and a half percent in 2002.20  This increase
occurred even as company and portfolio values dropped.21  Corpo-
rate assets used to compensate the top five executives at companies
grew from less than five percent to more than ten percent of aggre-
gate corporate earnings from 1993 to 2003.22  Again, many compa-
nies have seen CEO pay rise as shareholder returns have gone
down.23
These figures suggest that, as a percentage of aggregate corpo-
rate earnings, pay for U.S. executives is too high compared to the
compensation of the average worker, and it is “delinked” to com-
pany performance.24
Similar studies suggest that pay is too high when compared to
executive compensation of foreign counterparts,25 and when com-
17. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. to Require More Disclosure of Executive Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Labaton, Disclosure]; see also THE CONFER-
ENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 4 n.3 (find-
ing that between 1992 and 2002, CEO compensation rose three hundred and forty
percent in comparison to thirty-six percent for the average worker).
18. Labaton, Disclosure, supra note 17, at A1. R
19. Amy Cortese, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Smaller Fish Are Also Doing
Swimmingly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at 7.
20. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. to Propose New Rules on How Executive Pay Is Re-
ported, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Labaton, Executive Pay].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Tommy McCall, Chart, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Pay for Performance?
Sometimes, But Not Always, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at C6.
24. Labaton, Executive Pay, supra note 20. When commentators suggest pay is R
“delinked” from performance they mean pay is high at underperforming companies
as compared to more successful peer competitors. See, e.g., McCall, supra note 23, at R
C6.
25. A 1999 study found that the United States had the highest total current com-
pensation (salary and annual bonus) at 573,000 euros followed by the United King-
dom (470,000 euros), Canada (355,000 euros), and France (227,000 euros).  Mark J.
Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1, 1 n.6 (2000).  If the study had included long-term incentive compensation, the dif-
ference between the United States and the other countries would have been greater.
See id.
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pared to other highly sought after employees, such as sports
figures, entertainers, and professionals including attorneys and in-
vestment bankers.26
There are two counterarguments to the claim that pay is too
high.  One argument is that even if executives are overpaid, it is not
a problem.27  Many people are not shareholders.28  Even for those
who are shareholders, the amount of value dilution that results
from over-compensation is negligible on a per share basis.29  This
suggests that the problem gets disproportionate attention.30  As a
response to this first common counterargument, critics of executive
compensation generally argue that excessive compensation indi-
cates broader governance problems, affects company morale, and
is used by rating agencies as a factor in debt and credit ratings.31
The other argument countering the claim that executive compen-
sation is too high is that market forces serve to limit executive com-
pensation and that executives are worth what they earn.32
Commentators who hold this view suggest that the executive com-
pensation problem is overstated and that major tinkering with cor-
porate governance should be avoided, especially insofar as it
suggests giving more power to shareholders.33  These commenta-
tors point to the large pool of potential executives and the compa-
nies that bid for their services, and they conclude that the free
market fixes compensation.34  They note the wealth of information
available about compensation and the qualifications of the execu-
26. Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive
Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795,
798-99 (1995).
27. Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial
Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L.
255, 257 (2005).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Claudia H. Deutsch, Behind Big Dollars, Worrisome Boards, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2006, at C6.
32. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing that research does not sup- R
port the proposition that CEOs are overpaid); Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are
Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64 HARV. BUS. REV. 125 (1986) (stating that executive
compensation is not excessive); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975-78 (1980) (contending that market forces control excessive
compensation).
33. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1615 (2005) (critiquing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
(Harvard Univ. Press ed., 2004)).
34. Loewenstein, supra note 25, at 2. R
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tives who receive that compensation.35  Furthermore, they argue
that studies suggesting that pay is delinked to stock performance
ignore the fact that CEOs may have little ability to influence stock
prices because many factors, including general economic condi-
tions and politics, affect prices.36  These commentators conclude
that competition for CEOs is fierce and considerable, which leads
to efficient and appropriate levels of executive pay.37
The Process of Setting Pay Is Flawed
There are three central figures in the internal corporate struc-
ture: shareholders, the board of directors, and management.38
Shareholders are the owners of the company.  Through an agency
relationship, they directly “elect” a board of directors at an annual
meeting.  The board of directors then selects management, who in
turn runs the company.
While shareholders are theoretically the most powerful stake-
holder, problems of rational apathy significantly diminish their
power.39  Most shareholders are rationally apathetic; since their in-
vestments are small, they will not research companies or make so-
phisticated voting decisions.40  Large institutional investors are the
exception since they are more sophisticated and have more influ-
ence, but even they face the hurdle of the expenses involved in
bringing shareholder actions.41
The board of directors has the ultimate authority to set executive
compensation.42  Although Delaware law is silent on methods of
35. Id.
36. Id. at 7.  This inference works both ways.  If CEOs have little ability to influ-
ence stock prices, why are they worth so much to shareholders?
37. Id. at 2.
38. For a more thorough description of these relationships, see JEFFREY D.
BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 456-
68, 476-80 (5th ed. 2003).
39. Id. at 476-78.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Delaware’s statute states “[t]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (2007).  Delaware’s law will be discussed primarily throughout this comment
because of its status as the preferred state of incorporation, including more than half
of all U.S. publicly-traded companies. See Delaware Division of Corporation, http://
www.state.de.us/corp/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).  Delaware claims this is due to the
state’s “business friendly” statutes, simplified procedures, and well respected courts.
See id.  Others, however, suggest Delaware is often the preferred state of incorpora-
tion because it won a “race to the bottom” to have the most relaxed corporate laws.
See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 670-71 (1974) (stating “in its zeal to maintain its primacy as the fa-
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setting compensation, including whether a compensation commit-
tee is necessary, compensation cannot breach the directors’ fiduci-
ary duties.43 Permissible indemnity rights, however, take the
potency of these duties away.44  Where shareholder actions success-
fully challenge executive compensation, there is often a taint of
self-dealing.45
In many public corporations the task of setting pay is delegated
to a compensation committee46 since such a committee is required
to qualify for certain tax deductions47 and for a New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) listing.48  The committees are typically com-
posed of “disinterested” and independent outside directors who
determine executive compensation,49 but the actual extent of these
directors’ independence is debatable.
The CEO and management typically nominate directors, which
might create a sense of loyalty or concern for continuing nomina-
tion in future elections.50  There is also an “old boys club” element
to the nominations in that personal friends of the CEO or CEOs
from other companies are often selected, which might create mo-
tive for tacit or even subconscious inflation of salaries.51  For exam-
vored state of incorporation Delaware adopts legal rules that favor directors and
management at the expense of shareholders”).
43. Delaware’s common law fiduciary duty of due care requires that directors “use
that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances.” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748 (Del. Ch.
2005).  Breaches are not easy to prove, as the plaintiff must show gross negligence
evidenced by reckless indifference or systematic failure to exercise reasonable over-
sight. See id.
44. These clauses limit shareholders to injunctive relief for most common
breaches. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (providing permissible indemnification
rights); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (allowing certificates of incorpora-
tion to include a provision eliminating personal liability of a director for breach of the
duty of care).
45. See In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, 325 F.3d
795, 800 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding breach of good faith duty where chairman sold signif-
icant stock shortly before disclosing problems to public).
46. Delaware creates authority to assemble committees for such tasks. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2).
47. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(3).
48. NYSE, NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 303A.05 (2004), http://www.nyse.com/
listed/1022221393251.html (follow “Click here to Open NYSE Listed Company Man-
ual” hyperlink; then follow “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility” hyperlink) [herein-
after Listed Manual].
49. Charles C. Pak, Toward Reasonable Executive Compensation: Outcry for Re-
form, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633, 645 (1995).
50. Id.  The NYSE’s recent reforms, however, require boards to have director-
nominating committees that are composed entirely of independent directors. See
Listed Manual, supra note 48, § 303A.04. R
51. Pak, supra note 49, at 645. R
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ple, in 1996, almost ninety percent of companies had at least one
CEO or Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) on its board.52
Compensation consultants who owe no fiduciary duties to share-
holders may also advise the committees.53  Management typically
hires these consultants.54  Thus, the consultants will often have an
incentive to push compensation upward to guarantee future con-
sulting contracts.55  For example, the New York Times recently re-
ported that Verizon’s compensation consultant received $500
million in consulting fees from Verizon between 1997 and 2005.56
Directors often rely heavily on consultant’s figures because the di-
rectors themselves are typically not experts in compensation, typi-
cally have separate full time jobs, and might meet as infrequently
as four times a year.57
An illustrative example is the Disney Board in the period prior
to the hiring of the CEO’s friend as the company president.58  A
Delaware court described the Compensation Committee as
“stacked” with the CEO’s personal friends and acquaintances, who
although “not necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were
certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support him un-
conditionally than truly independent directors.”59  The director
that mainly negotiated the contract also served as the CEO’s per-
sonal attorney.60  Critics suggest that a market failure inevitably oc-
52. BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 585. R
53. Pak, supra note 49, at 645. R
54. Id.
55. Eric Dash, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Off to the Races Again, Leaving
Many Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at C1.
56. Gretchen Morgenson, Gilded Paychecks: Troubling Conflicts; Outside Advice
on Boss’s Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1, A16
[hereinafter Morgenson, Paychecks]; see also Letter from Mark M. Reilly, Partner,
Compensation Consulting Consortium, to Nancy Morris, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 6,
2006) http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/mmreilly8793.pdf (citing other prom-
inent examples of compensation consultants that lacked independence).  Public com-
ments on proposed rules are just that—comments made by the interested public,
typically solicited during the proposed phase of rulemaking and posted without
change on the SEC website.  SEC, See How to Submit Comments, http://www.sec.gov/
rules/submitcomments.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
57. See Pak, supra note 49, at 645. R
58. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005).
59. Id. at 760-61.  This board relationship is completely legal. See id.
60. Id. at 144.  In another dramatic example, a Compensation Committee ap-
proved special payments to WorldCom’s CEO after the CEO allowed the head of the
Committee to use a company airplane.  Don Stancavish, WorldCom to Get Report on
Rescinding Ebbers’s Pay, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 10, 2002.
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curs when this favoritism combines with a relative inability of
shareholders to influence director elections.61
Another problem is the so-called Lake Woebegone Syndrome,
under which all CEOs are above average.62  Many firms choose to
benchmark salaries at sixty-five percent of their competitors, and
often use unnamed aspirational peers rather than those firms with
whom they realistically compete for talent.63  No board wants to
tell a CEO that she deserves only the average salary when com-
pared to others, especially when they tout the CEO’s above-aver-
age abilities.64  Instead, the board pays the CEO above the
average, and bases that compensation against high-profile, high-
paying companies rather than those for whom they might legiti-
mately compete for business and talent.65  Inflated figures are then
given to consultants, which ultimately boosts salaries across
America.66
Problems in How Compensation Is Disclosed
In addition to substantive and procedural problems, critics point
to the obfuscation of annual reports.67  As SEC Chairman Cox said
in an interview with the New York Times, disclosure has become
less accurate and less useful in recent years.68
The most commonly cited example of faulty disclosure is Jack
Welch.  In 2002, “the world learned about Jack Welch’s retirement
perks—including Red Sox tickets, a Manhattan apartment for life,
country club memberships, and free use of a corporate jet—not
61. Dorff, supra note 27, at 290-91 (concluding that CEO power over directors
results in excessive compensation using an experimental model); see also Douglas C.
Michael, The Corporate Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of
Executive Compensation, 17 J. CORP. L. 785, 798 (1992).
62. This reference, sometimes made by commentators, is to Garrison Keillor’s “A
Prairie Home Companion” radio show.  The show typically has a storytelling segment
about Lake Wobegon, which is always described as “the little town that time forgot
and the decades cannot improve . . . where the women are strong, the men are good-
looking, and all the children are above average.” See A Prairie Home Companion
From American Public Media Home Page, http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/about
(last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
63. Rachel Beck, Benchmarking Inflates CEO’s Salaries, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29,
2005, available at http://www.equilar.com/NewsArticles/032905_BostonGlobe.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Cox, supra note 1.
68. Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won’t Tame C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006,
at C1.
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from the General Electric proxy statement, but from his angry
wife’s divorce papers.”69
Comments submitted to the SEC suggest that the problem is
larger than headline cases.  One commentator, an expert witness,
wrote:
I personally observed obscurantism involved in executive com-
pensation when I had the chief legal officer of a top Fortune 100
corporation explain the correct way to calculate executive com-
pensation.  The legal officer based the explanation on data pub-
lished in the annual report. The legal officers [sic] company had
just announced an [eighty-three million dollar] bonus award to
executives of the company.  The company had been in bank-
ruptcy for two years.  I have been reading annual reports for
more than [forty] years, yet it took the legal officer a full hour to
lead me through all the separate line items needed to calculate
an approximation of the . . . bonuses involved.  That is
obscurantism.70
The proliferation of stock options and perquisites are two major
forms of stealth compensation.  Stock options are particularly mis-
leading since their reported value is the book value at the time they
are granted.71  As a result, shareholders cannot tell how much their
CEOs are actually being paid.72  Instead, shareholders only learn
how much their board thought they would pay at the time the stock
options were granted.73  This figure might bear no relation to the
actual value of the stocks when exercised.74  Stock option backdat-
ing is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the potential for
misleading investors, since the stock is dated at an earlier point
(when the stock price was lower)75—making the exchange the
equivalent of granting cash.76  In other words, investors think that
options create incentives for future performance when in fact, they
just pay cash without incentives.77  Cablevision’s actions provide a
69. Id.
70. Michael Phillips, Comment from Expert Witness on Executive Compensation
(Feb. 13, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/mphillips9996.
htm.
71. Patrick McGeehan, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Options in the Mirror,
Bigger Than They Seem, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 3, at 6.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Paul Krugman, Incentives for the Dead, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at A23.
76. See generally id.
77. Id.
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well-illustrated example.78 Cablevision gave stock options to a de-
ceased executive and backdated the options to make it appear as if
the executives had received the option while he was still alive.79
Stealth compensation can also take other forms.  For example,
CEOs may defer compensation without disclosing its existence,
and in some cases, may earn an above-market interest rate on the
money, thereby adding millions to those earnings.80  Compounding
these problems, there is little disclosure regarding how compensa-
tion is set.  Compensation consultants’ names and relationships to
corporations are often unknown to shareholders or the public.81
Regulatory Responses
Within the past twenty years some states, the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”), the SEC, stock exchanges, compensation commit-
tees, and interest groups have implemented a wealth of reforms
with regard to executive compensation.  These reforms have re-
sulted in mixed success.  The most prominent attempts are de-
scribed below, along with an assessment of each reform’s
effectiveness.
IRS Tax Code Reforms (1984 and 1993)
Congress has tried to regulate executive compensation through
the IRS.  In 1984, Congress enacted section 280(g), which disal-
lowed tax deductions for certain “golden parachutes” through the
IRS tax code,82 and in 1993 Congress enacted section 162(m),
which eliminated tax deductions for executive compensation above
one million dollars unless certain conditions are met.83  Compensa-
tion contingent on performance goals is exempt from the rule.84
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Gretchen Morgenson, A ‘Holy Cow’ Moment in Payland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2006, at 1.
81. Morgenson, Paychecks, supra note 56, at A1, A16. R
82. 26 U.S.C.A. § 280(g) (West 2007).  A golden parachute is an “anti-takeover”
protection mechanism that gives officers a lucrative amount of money, stock options,
and other perks if they are fired during a takeover. See id.
83. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27 (2007).  This reform also created strict federal inde-
pendence standards since, if a director has ever been an officer of the publicly held
corporation, she will be defined as an inside director for tax purposes. See id. § 1.162-
27(e)(3)(C).  If she sits on the compensation committee, the consequences of the IRS
determining that she is an inside director is that the compensation committee cannot
set acceptable performance goals for the purpose of obtaining performance-based tax
deductions. Id.
84. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(c).  Stock options are considered performance-
based remuneration for the purpose of the IRS tax deductions. Id.
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These reforms came under criticism quickly.85  Commentators
have suggested that section 162(m) “made [one million dollars] the
new salary floor.”86  Further, commentators claim that both re-
forms led to more, often hidden, salary inflation as corporations
started offering “gross-ups”—money to offset the increased tax
burden.87
Additionally, after the performance-based tax laws were en-
acted, many firms started paying executives with stock options,
which meant that executives were being paid regardless of how
they performed.  Some commentators call such incentives “paying
for pulse” because to receive the incentive, executives only need to
stay alive.  Stock options fit this category because “if you give
someone two million options at today’s price and it’s not indexed
to the market and it’s not indexed to the peer group, he’s going to
get paid on the basis of what the market does, not on what he
does.”88
The tax laws remain unchanged despite these criticisms.  One ex-
planation of congressional inaction in altering the reform is that
Congress does not have the expertise of the SEC in handling cor-
porate governance matters.89
SEC Disclosure Reforms (1992)
The SEC last reformed its executive compensation policy in
1992.90  The change in policy required corporations to include
shareholder proposals that relate to executive compensation in
their proxy materials.91  These proposals were previously excluda-
ble as “ordinary business operations” of the company.92  The 1992
reforms also required companies to “unbundle” proxy propositions
85. See, e.g., Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Conse-
quences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1679 (2004).
86. See, e.g., NOCERA, supra note 68, at C1.
87. Phyllis Plitch, For Some CEO’s, ‘Gross-Up‘ Perk Cushions Fall, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 2005, AT C3.  THE Journal cited a study claiming seventy-two percent of the
chief executives of the NYSE’s top fifty companies enjoy golden parachute “gross-
ups,” that is, gross-ups triggered when executives receive severance packages. Id.
88. William J. Holstein, Office Space: Armchair M.B.A.; The Case for Cutting the
Chief’s Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 10.
89. Cf. Joan M. Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 275,
284-87 (2005) (arguing that Congress may be presumed not to have expertise in cor-
porate governance while the SEC has expertise in corporate governance matters).
90. See Salky, supra note 26, at 809-10. R
91. Id. at 809.
92. Id.
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involved in a shareholder vote.93  Prior rules allowed companies to
force shareholders to vote for a bundle of propositions even if they
opposed individual propositions.94  The 1992 changes in disclosure
rules included five components: (1) a “Summary Compensation Ta-
ble” summarizing CEO compensation, as well as the compensation
of the next four highest paid officers; (2) a compensation commit-
tee report by the board explaining performance factors used to
make compensation decisions; (3) tables explaining long-term in-
centives such as stock options and stock appreciation rights; (4) a
“Performance Graph” comparing the corporation’s total share-
holder return to various indices; and (5) disclosure of potential
conflicts of interest of compensation committee members.95
NYSE Listing Standard Reforms (2003)
In order to have their stocks traded on national exchanges, such
as the New York Stock Exchange, companies must follow the list-
ing standards of those exchanges.96  In 2003, for example, new
NYSE listing manual amendments required compensation commit-
tees to consider the listed company’s performance, relative share-
holder return, awards given to the CEO candidate in the past
years, as well as the value of similar incentives to CEOs at compa-
rable companies.97  Committees must also produce a report which
outlines their process.98  The reforms also added a requirement for
shareholder approval for stock option plans,99 and director inde-
pendence standards.100
The Duty of Good Faith (2002-2005)
Recently, shareholders have attempted to create a limit on salary
through Delaware’s fiduciary duty of good faith.101  For a time,
93. Id.
94. Id. at 810.
95. Id.; see also Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126-48,128
(Oct. 21, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 240, 249). For an example of a
current compensation disclosure, see IBM, Investor Relations, http://www.ibm.com/
investor/corpgovernance/cgec.phtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
96. See generally Listed Manual, supra note 48. R
97. See id. § 303(A)(5).
98. Id. § 303(A)(5)(b)(i)(C).
99. Id. § 303(A)(8).  Loopholes exist, however, that can be used to avoid seeking
shareholder approval for these plans. See Roshan Sonthalia, Comment, Shareholder
Voting on All Stock Option Plans: An Unnecessary and Unwise Proposition, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 1203, 1215-16 (2004).
100. See Listed Manual, supra note 48, § 303A.02(a). R
101. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005).
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courts struggled to define what the “duty of good faith” meant,
including whether it placed a substantive limit on executive salaries
or if the duty was limited to process factors.102  The Delaware
Chancery Court recently held that a breach of good faith cannot
involve a substantive limit, and rather requires intentional failure
to engage in a reasonable decision making process.103  In addition
to limiting the breach to procedural deficiencies, this adds a mens
rea element to the cause of action.  Delaware’s courts appear to
have rejected the effort to impose a substantive limit on executive
compensation using the duty of good faith, given their dismissal of
a high profile case with extreme facts.104
Sarbanes-Oxley (2002)
Although cutting deeper into the areas of auditing, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 affected executive compensation when it prohib-
ited public corporations from extending credit to executive officers
or directors, renewing such credit, or arranging an extension of
credit.105 Apart from traditional notions of personal loans, the ex-
pansive language of Sarbanes-Oxley applies to many other execu-
tive compensation benefits, such as the cashless exercise of stock
options and split-dollar life insurance polices.106  It also mandates
that certain executive officers must reimburse certain bonuses and
compensation to the issuer if the company is required to restate its
earnings due to misconduct.107
102. Compare id. at 753-56 (holding a breach of good faith cannot involve a sub-
stantive limit, and rather requires intentional failure to engage in a reasonable deci-
sion making process), with IN RE PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 801 A.2d 295, 311-
13 (N.J. 2002) (holding board decisions must be reasonable); see also In re Abbott
Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, 325 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2003)
(applying Delaware law and holding board breached duty of good faith without men-
tioning process factors).  Former New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
went further to substantively limit executive compensation in the not-for-profit realm.
See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 515(b) (McKinney 2007).  This statute was
used against the NYSE’s head, Richard Grasso, and Adelphi University’s President,
Peter Diamandopoulos, to refund portions of their salaries. See Beverly Goodman,
From Wall Street to Your Nonprofit’s Office, NON-PROFIT TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, http://
www.nptimes.com/fme/oct04/fme_1.html. Grasso’s case is currently being appealed.
Grasso to Challenge a Judge’s Ruling on Compensation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, AT
C10.
103. See In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d. at 752.
104. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d. 693.
105. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402(k)(1), 116 Stat. 787 (2002).
106. See Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Executive Compensation Following the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2115, 2135 (2003).
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (West 2007).
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Emergence of Interest Groups
Institutional investors and shareholder service groups have also
sought to regulate executive compensation by developing “best
practices” guidelines and pressuring corporate boards to confirm to
these guidelines. Implicated in these private attempts to regulate
executive compensation is the suggestion that government under-
regulation is responsible for some of the problems described in
Part I of this Comment, and that these private organizations can fill
the gap created by public under-regulation.  While they serve as a
check on management and directorial power, after the initial high
expectation of rising influence, it appears that only a minority of
institutional investors—predominately public and union pension
funds—choose to play an active role in corporate governance.108
Institutional investors may follow social or political agendas,
rather than protect the economic interest of shareholders.109  For
example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“CalPERS”), one of the largest institutional shareholders in
America, will often support social policy issues.110  Additionally,
unions have used their pension funds as a bargaining chip in labor
negotiations.111
For many, a greater concern is the influence of Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc. (“ISS”) in filling the gaps left by state
and federal regulators.112  ISS is the world’s leading adviser to big
shareholders on corporate elections.113  It has a client roster of
1,600 institutions that together own twenty-three trillion dollars
worth of stocks, which is about half the world’s stock market
value.114  Nearly all these institutions pay for ISS’s views on corpo-
rate elections.115  Thus, the power for decision making, which af-
108. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 630 (2006).
109. Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional In-
vestors (2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=796227.
110. Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling TINA’S Ghost from the Post-Enron Corporate
Governance Debate, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 74-75 (2002) (suggesting that
CalPERS’s support is a positive development).
111. Aaron Bernstein & Amy Borrus, Labor Sharpens Its Pension Sword, BUS.
WEEK ONLINE, Nov. 24, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_47/
b3859089_mz021.htm.
112. Dean Starkman, A Proxy Adviser’s Two Sides: Some Question Work of ISS for
Companies It Scrutinizes, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at D1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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fects a significant amount of corporate governance rules, is placed
in ISS.116
ISS’s most recent policy guidance suggests it will focus increas-
ingly on executive compensation.117  It sets out a case-by-case ap-
proach that looks at factors including payouts delinked to
performance, internal pay disparities, and performance metrics
that are changed during the performance period.118
While the use of these metrics is likely good, commentators have
expressed concern surrounding extensive reliance on ISS’s views
because of the company’s apparent conflict of interest.  Often, ISS
acts as an adviser to the corporations it rates.119  As one securities
lawyer put it, “[i]f your governance is not getting a good grade, you
go see them and they tell you how to get a good grade . . . . If that’s
not a conflict, I don’t know what is.”120  Thus, a self-interested third
party holds the power to fill the gaps in corporate governance,
rather than an objective governance agency.
One industry response to this problem was to fund the creation
of a new proxy advisor firm, Proxy Governance Inc., which has
been criticized for its own conflict of interest for direct ties to
management.121
116. “‘You have centralized decision-making about what governance should look
like,’ said Gary Lutin, principal of New York investment bank Lutin & Co, and a
long-time ISS critic. ‘Who anointed these guys?’” Id.
117. See ISS, ISS U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2006 UPDATES 17 (2005),
available at http://media.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/2006_us_policy_up-
date_1117051.pdf [hereinafter ISS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY].
118. Id.
119. Starkman, supra note 112, at D1.
120. Id.  ISS is not the only rating agency that has had suspicions cast on it for
advising the companies that it rates.  The SEC questioned Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s similar practices regarding stock ratings. See Concept Release:  Rating Agen-
cies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-8236, 34-47972, http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/33-8236.htm; cf. In
re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying Fitch Rating service press
“Shield” privileges because of its self interest with companies it serves, and suggesting
rating services are no longer impartial reporters when they are paid by companies
they are rating).  Institutional shareholders also face pressure to subscribe to ISS,
since it gives them cover in fulfilling their fiduciary duty of care to their members in
voting—and is less costly than weighing the costs and benefits of each company for
which they cast votes. See Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman of the Board
and CEO, Business Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 22, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf.
121. See Gretchen Morgenson, Pfizer and the Proxy Advisor: Drug Maker Has Ties
to Firm that Endorsed Its Slate of Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at C1.
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Current Points of Tension Within Rules
Since there are so many official and unofficial regulatory bodies,
they sometimes provide contradictory incentives that result in un-
predictability and over-regulation of executive compensation.  This
seems almost inevitable given the differing biases, mandates, self-
interests, and expertise levels of the stakeholders.  Some of the
more prominent tension points are described below.
What makes a director independent?
Qualification for membership of the compensation committee is
a focal point of controversy since definitive standards for director
independence are almost completely lacking.122
Because no single organization has explicit authority to create
definitive corporate governance standards, many organizations
have developed their own standards to judge independence, includ-
ing the IRS, the SEC, the NYSE, the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”), and several
interest groups.123
At one end of the spectrum, state law relies only on a vague duty
of loyalty to address independence issues, but breaches are very
difficult to prove.124  On the other end, the IRS requires that the
compensation committee consist solely of “outside directors” de-
fined as directors who have never been an officer of the company
and who receive no other compensation from the company except
for as a director.125
122. See CalPERS, Core Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance, http://
www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/page09.asp (last visited Apr. 16,
2007) (suggesting that a uniform definition of independence is needed).
123. For a more extensive discussion, see And Now the Independent Director! Have
Congress, the NYSE, and NASDAQ Finally Figured Out How to Make the Indepen-
dent Director Actually Work?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2181 (2004) [hereinafter And Now
the Independent Director].
124. See, e.g., Beam v. Steward, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049-52 (Del. 2004) (holding direc-
tors are entitled to a presumption that they were faithful to their fiduciary duties and
that friendship or an outside business relationship with a CEO is not enough to rebut
that presumption).
125. The performance goal under which compensation is paid must be estab-
lished by a compensation committee comprised solely of two or more
outside directors. A director is an outside director if the director [i]s not a
current employee of the publicly held corporation; [i]s not a former em-
ployee of the publicly held corporation who receives compensation for prior
services (other than benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan) during
the taxable year; [h]as not been an officer of the publicly held corporation;
and [d]oes not receive remuneration from the publicly held corporation, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, in any capacity other than as a director. For this
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Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has created standards for direc-
tor independence that only apply to audit committee members.126
These are, in certain ways, stricter than the national exchange
rules, but in other ways, more vague.127  The SEC also regulates
independence standards indirectly through its influence of stock
exchanges rules.  Directors are not “independent” unless the board
of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no mate-
rial relationship with the listed company.128  This can be seen as a
flexible catch-all standard, rather than a hard and fast rule like the
tax code.  The NYSE also creates more solid rules that—unlike the
tax code—limit the material relationship effect to three years.129
Under the NYSE standard, there is a lack of independence where
there are “interlocking directorates” on two companies’ compensa-
tion committees.130
Interest groups have created their own independence rules that
incorporate the governmental and exchange guidelines.  For exam-
ple, ISS creates three categories of directors: Inside Director, Affil-
iated Outside Director, and Independent Outside Director.131
These standards diverge from the IRS and NYSE standards.  One
example of this divergence is “cooling-off” periods that must pass
between the ending of an interest and board membership before a
director is considered independent.  For ISS, the cooling-off period
is five years, but infinite if the director was once a CEO of the
company.132  For the NYSE, there is a consistent three-year cool-
ing-off period.133  For the IRS, there is a lifetime ban for certain
purpose, remuneration includes any payment in exchange for goods or
services.
26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(3) (2005).
126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201-04, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7231-34 (West 2007).
127. For example, unlike the national exchange rules, directors are allowed no com-
pensation outside their role as directors. Id.; see also And Now the Independent Di-
rector, supra note 123, at 2188 n.32. R
128. Listed Manual, supra note 48, § 303A.02(a). R
129. Id. § 303A.02(b).
130. Id. § 303A.02(b)(iv).  Interlocking directorates exist where an executive officer
of company A has a director on company B’s board, and an executive officer of com-
pany B also has a director on company A. Id.; see also ISS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICY, supra note 117, at 7 n.6. R
131. ISS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY, supra note 117, at 5. R
132. Id.
133. Listed Manual, supra note 48, at § 303A.02(b). R
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executives, and the ban is extended to executives of acquired
companies.134
The net effect of these independence standards is cumulative and
companies must follow the most stringent standards set by all
stakeholders to avoid repercussions.  This creates a situation where
under federal law a director may be “independent” for audit com-
mittee purposes but not compensation committee purposes.
Smaller companies or companies located in “company towns” are
likely to find the increased standards especially burdensome, since
they will have more difficulty finding parties without material links
who are also qualified to serve as members.  Even larger compa-
nies may find it difficult to find qualified members given that
outside directors must be qualified and may not violate antitrust
provisions.135
Debate also exists as to whether director independence even
matters.136  Although past studies on the subject should be viewed
skeptically given the fogginess of what “independence” means, if it
were true that independence did not improve shareholder value,
then the negative effects of over-regulation would be even more
pronounced.
Options: Friend or Foe?
When Congress enacted section 162(m) stating that executive
compensation above one million dollars was no longer tax deducti-
ble,137 but exempted stock options from the rule,138 corporations
were given a strong incentive to use stock options.
After stock option plans came under heavy criticism, other regu-
lators created disincentives, even as the IRS incentive remained.
For example, in 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(“FASB”), which sets “generally accepted accounting standards,”
announced that stock options must be expensed to meet generally
134. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(3)(i)(vi) (2007) (“[A]n outside director would no longer
be an outside director if a corporation in which the director was previously an officer
became an affiliated corporation of the publicly held corporation.”).
135. BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 579. R
136. Id. at 587-90.
137. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27.  This reform also created strict federal independence
standards because if director has ever been an officer of the publicly held corporation,
she will be considered an inside director for tax purposes. See id. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(C).
Thus, if she sits on the compensation committee, the committee cannot set acceptable
performance goals for the purpose of obtaining performance-based tax deductions.
Id.
138. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(c).
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accepted accounting standards.139  The recent NYSE reforms also
added a requirement of shareholder approval for stock option
plans.140  Finally, the SEC reversed its previous position on this is-
sue, and announced that companies would no longer be allowed to
exclude option-expensing proposals from their proxy statements
based on the “ordinary business” exception.141  As a result of this
triad of pressures, companies have reduced their use of stock op-
tions because it looks worse on their financial statements.142
What Is the Effect of State and Private Sector Encroachment
on Traditional SEC Roles?
In the past few years, state and private sectors have begun to
encroach on some of the SEC’s traditional roles in governing cor-
porate law.  Most notably, ISS has treaded on the SEC’s disclosure
authority while some state attorney generals have taken a far more
aggressive role in regulating corporate fraud.
ISS has started to increasingly challenge the primacy of the
SEC’s traditional disclosure authority.  Since the SEC released its
proposed disclosure rules to update executive compensation re-
quirements, ISS has released its own competing disclosure chart,
including the notation that the update was necessary because “the
current SEC requirements on pay disclosure are inadequate,” and
the suggestion that the chart would be updated further if the SEC
adopts new disclosure rules.143  This chart consists of numerous cat-
egories that are not currently disclosed under SEC rules, including
the amount of “gross-ups” given and the structure of differed
compensation.144
Recently, state attorney generals, most notably Eliot Spitzer in
New York, have begun to compete with the SEC’s traditional role
139. See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123R (rev. 2004),
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf.  Prior to this, the use of options was reported, but
not as an expense.
140. N.Y.S.E. Listing Standard § 303(A)(8) (2002). There are, however, loopholes
that can be used to avoid seeking shareholder approval for these plans. See Sonthalia,
supra note 99, at 1203, 1215-16. R
141. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2002 WL 31749942 (Dec. 6, 2002).
142. It is also noteworthy that each of these stakeholders are subject to SEC influ-
ence. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
143. See ISS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY, supra note 117, at 18-19. R
144. Id.
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as an agenda setter and enforcer in the area of securities fraud.145
For example, the SEC and the N.Y. Attorney General negotiated
separate settlements in the Alliance Capital mutual fund fraud
case.146  The SEC ordered Alliance Capital to pay $250 million for
the fraud.147  Spitzer reached a separate settlement that required
Alliance Capital to offer fee discounts to customers.148  The SEC’s
reaction indicated it felt this was rulemaking by enforcement.149
How Should Pay Be Set to Reflect Performance?
Stock options are only one controversial aspect of a larger ques-
tion of how pay can fairly reflect performance.  Interest groups
have actively promoted guidelines that outline how to precisely de-
termine compensation, including pressuring committees to take ac-
count of payouts under all scenarios.150  The debate escalates when
the search for a fair number starts.  As noted above, no board
wants to tell a CEO that she deserves only the average salary when
compared to others, but rules are unclear on how to stop this trend.
The NYSE standards allow the consideration of the value of in-
centives to CEOs at comparable companies as one of several fac-
tors.151  Other organizations reject this approach.  For example, the
Conference Board, an organization composed of high-ranking
CEOs, chairpersons, and government figures, has suggested refus-
ing to base compensation on median compensation statistics, which
tends to lead to artificial inflation as everyone attempts to reach
145. See Jonathan R. Macey, State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 117, 128 (2004) (arguing that Spitzer has used the New York Attorney Gen-
eral’s office to usurp traditional SEC governance functions).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 130.  When asked whether his recent activities should have been taken
by the SEC rather than a state attorney general, Spitzer was quoted as responding
“Yes but they haven’t.  And if they haven’t . . . we will do it.” Id. at 127.
150. The Business Roundtable, an organization composed of CEOs of major com-
panies, is representative in its guidelines for determining executive compensation.
The guidelines state that at minimum:
[T]he compensation committee should understand all aspects of the compen-
sation package and should review the maximum payout under that package,
including all benefits.  The compensation committee should understand the
maximum payout under multiple scenarios, including retirement, termina-
tion with or without cause, and severance in connection with business combi-
nations or the sale of the business.
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: PRINCIPLES AND COMMEN-
TARY 1 (2003), http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/ExecutiveCompensationPrinci-
ples.pdf.
151. See N.Y.S.E. Listing Standard § 303(A)(5) (2002).
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the top quartile.152  The Conference Board found that since recent
levels of compensation were excessive, they were not an appropri-
ate baseline for setting future compensation.153
II. THE SEC’S MANDATE
Although the SEC has various tools with which to regulate com-
pensation, the SEC’s mandate to do so becomes blurry once its
rulemaking authority is used to create regulations that go beyond
disclosure.  The blurriness has made several recent rulemaking ac-
tions appear either ineffective or beyond its mandate.  The effect of
this uncertainty on executive compensation will become clearer in
Part III, which argues that this uncertainty has prevented the SEC
from adequately dealing with the excessiveness, process, predict-
ability, and over-regulation problems outlined above.154
Background of the SEC’s Rulemaking Authority
The SEC is an independent federal commission created through
and empowered by the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.155  The SEC
possesses rulemaking powers that have been used to compel disclo-
sure.156  The primary vehicles for this disclosure are annual reports
that public companies must send to shareholders, and Form 10-K
reports that companies must send to the SEC.157  Companies with
more than ten million dollars in assets whose securities are held by
more than five hundred owners must produce these and other peri-
odic reports and disclosure materials to solicit shareholders’ votes
152. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE 4-8 (2003), http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/SR-03-04.pdf.
153. BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 584. R
154. See infra Part III .
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (codifying the 1934 Act).  The five commissioner
positions are appointed by the President and split between the parties, so that neither
party ever has more than three seats. Id.  Once appointed, the executive branch can-
not remove or interfere with commissioners’ activities. See Heminway, supra note 89,
at 279-81.  This makes the commission fairly bipartisan and independent. Id. at 280-
82.  This is often, although not always, true in practice.  For example, the current SEC
administration (composed of three Republicans and two Democrats) unanimously en-
dorsed the recently proposed executive compensation rules. See John W. Schoen,
New Rules May Not Slow Growth of CEO Pay, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 7, 2006, http://
msnbc.msn.com/id/10895953/.
156. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
157. The 10-K report is submitted to the SEC and typically contains more detailed
information about the company’s financial condition than the annual report.  For a
fuller description, see SEC, Form 10-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2007) (describing Form 10-K); SEC, Annual Report, http://www.sec.
gov/answers/annrep.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (describing the Annual Report).
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in annual or special meetings held for the election of directors and
the approval of other corporate actions.158
As noted above, in certain circumstances, the SEC has the power
to directly regulate compensation through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that certain executive officers must re-
imburse certain bonuses and compensation to the issuer if the com-
pany is required to restate its earnings due to misconduct.159
Sarbanes-Oxley also gives the SEC power to prevent compensation
in the form of loans.160
The SEC also has indirect power over executive compensation
through its regulation of stock exchanges.161  The stock exchanges’
authority to control corporations arises from contract rights, and
the primary consequence of failing to comply with the exchanges is
de-listing the company.  Congress has given the SEC the ability to
oversee self-regulatory organizations, and to amend those organi-
zations’ rules where the SEC “deems necessary or appropriate [1]
to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization,
[2] to conform its rules to requirements of [the Exchange Act] and
the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organiza-
tion, or [3] otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of [the Ex-
change Act].”162  Self-regulatory organizations include stock
exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.163
The SEC has a significant hand in the NYSE guidelines because
it has approval power of the listing guidelines under section 19 of
the Securities Exchange Act.164  Additionally, whenever the stock
exchanges wish to modify their own rules they must obtain the
SEC’s approval.165  It has been suggested that these listing stan-
dards may have been influenced by a “regulation by raised eye-
158. SEC, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/
laws.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C.A. 7243 (West 2006).
160. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402(k)(1), 116 Stat. 787.
161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (West 2006).
162. Id.
163. See id. § 78c(a)(26) (“The term ‘self-regulatory organization’ means any na-
tional securities exchange [or] registered securities association . . . .”).
164. Even this authority is uncertain, as the D.C. Circuit questioned in dicta the
legitimacy of the SEC’s section 19(b) ability to approve rules affecting substantive
matters. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
165. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(1). This link is so strong that some commentators have
suggested NYSE actions may constitute “state action” for constitutional purposes.
Steven J. Cleveland, The NYSE as State Actor?: Rational Actors, Behavioral Insights
& Joint Investigations, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 84 (2005).
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brow” and that the SEC has a larger role in the guidelines.166  For
example, after the SEC suggested that the exchanges update their
guidelines in February 2002, on June 6, 2002, the NYSE issued a
report proposing broad new initiatives and the SEC released a si-
multaneous press release applauding the proposal.167  This process
resulted in the 2003 NYSE revisions.
The SEC also has indirect power available through regulating
section 14(a)(8) shareholder proposals.168  Rule 14(a)(8) requires a
public company to provide an opportunity for a shareholder who
owns a relatively small amount of the company’s securities to have
her proposal placed alongside management’s proposals in that
company’s proxy materials for presentation to a vote at an annual
or special meeting of shareholders.169  The rule generally requires
the company to include the proposal unless the shareholder has not
complied with the rule’s procedural requirements or the proposal
falls within one of the thirteen substantive bases for exclusion.170
166. Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE and NASDAQ; Order Approving NYSE
and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes and NASDAQ Amendment No. 1 and Notice
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to NYSE Amendments No. 1 and
2 and Nasdaq Amendments No. 2 and 3 Thereto Relating to Equity Compensation
Plans, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (July 3, 2003).  For another example, the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), AMEX, NYSE, and SEC promulgated a Mem-
orandum of Understanding in which they agreed that a blue sky exemption would be
granted to NASDAQ and exchange securities only if the self-regulated organizations
adopted voting rights listing standards tracking rule 19c-4. See Memorandum of Un-
derstanding: The Uniform Marketplace Exemption from State Securities Exemption
Requirements (Apr. 28, 1990), NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 2351 (1990) (quoted in Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 565, 627 (1991)); see also Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Gov-
ernance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571 (1984) (suggesting “regulation by raised eyebrow”
occurred when stock exchanges started requiring audit committees after the SEC sug-
gested it do so in a press conference); cf. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410 n.5.
167. Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Board Releases Report of Corporate Accounta-
bility and Listing Standards Committee (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.
org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pressrelease20020606.pdf; Statement by Commis-
sioner Harvey L. Pitt on the Draft Report of the NYSE’s Corporate Accountability
and Listing Standards Committee (June 6, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-
85.htm.  In other cases, the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the SEC have explicitly worked
together developing rules. See News Release, NASD, NYSE, NASD Move to
Strengthen Rules Concerning Analysts, IPOs Both Efforts in Support of Joint Effort
with SEC, NY Attorney General (Oct. 3, 2002), available at http://www.nasd.com/
PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/NASDW_002895 (noting “[t]he pro-
posed amendments were developed in a collaborative effort among the NYSE, the
SEC and NASD, and will be proposed to the SEC by the NYSE and NASD.”).
168. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1999).
169. SEC, Division of Corporate Finance: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, http://www.
sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
170. Id.
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What the SEC counts as a “basis for exclusion” has been used in a
way that affects substantive corporate governance.171  The inclu-
sion of executive compensation to the list of allowable proposals
has been important, as over the last few years the majority of sec-
tion 14(a)(8) shareholder proposals related to executive
compensation.172
Finally, the SEC has indirect power through its influence on ac-
counting standards.  The FASB sets generally accepted accounting
standards, including how compensation is expensed.173  The SEC
requires its registrants to adhere to FASB standards.174  Although
the FASB is an ostensibly independent quasi-governmental organi-
zation, since Sarbanes-Oxley was passed it has received govern-
ment funding that the SEC has power to oversee.175  Additionally,
the SEC has sway over who is selected to be on the board, or as the
SEC has framed it, while the FASB’s parent, the Financial Ac-
counting Foundation (“FAF”), “makes the final determinations re-
garding the selection of FASB and FAF members . . . we should
provide the FAF with our views and that the FAF should consider
those views in making its final selection.”176
The SEC may have more influence than this indicates.  For ex-
ample, a former SEC commissioner suggested that the FASB
would have required stock options to be expensed earlier if it had
been allowed to do so by the SEC.177
171. See generally SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 31749942 (Dec. 6, 2002).
172. G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Scandal Fallout: Tougher Evaluation of CEO Pay,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 21, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/
0321/p13s02-wmgn.html (“CEO pay was the single most frequent target of share-
holder resolutions in 2003 and 2004, and the 2005 proxy-voting season is shaping up to
follow suit.”).
173. Since 1973, the FASB has established U.S. financial accounting standards.
SEC Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-
Sector Standard Setter, Release Nos. 33-8227, 34-47743 (Apr. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm [hereinafter SEC Policy Statement].
174. Id.
175. J. Richard Williams, FUNDING FASB: PUBLIC MONEY, PUBLIC DOMAIN, CPA
J., May 2004, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/504/perspectives/
nv2.htm; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109, 15 U.S.C. 7219 (2006).
176. See SEC Policy Statement, supra note 173. R
177. Arthur Levitt, You Are the Guardians, CFO MAG. May 2003, available at http:/
/www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3009202/1/c_3046591 (stating that the SEC commissioner
told the paper, “I could have allowed FASB to go ahead with it. I didn’t, . . . I think it
would have gone through had I allowed it to.”).
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The Boundaries of the SEC’s Mandate
Historically, administrative agencies such as the SEC have en-
joyed broad deference from courts.178  The Supreme Court has
held that when a court reviews an agency’s construction of the stat-
ute that it administers, first, the court must first decide whether
Congress has spoken directly on the matter and follow Congress’s
interpretation if clear.179  If Congress has not spoken on the spe-
cific issue, then the court must ask whether the agency’s interpreta-
tion is based on a permissible construction of the statute.180  Even
if the court would have interpreted the statute differently, the
agency’s interpretation must control unless it is “arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”181  In addition, admin-
istrative agencies are not stopped from rulemaking merely because
to do so would preempt state law.182
As with all agencies, there are limits to the SEC’s rulemaking
power under its mandate.  The SEC rules “cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress.”183  Throughout its
history and increasingly since the early 1990s, the SEC, courts, and
commentators have struggled to define the scope of the SEC’s
rulemaking mandate.  Despite the deference granted to agencies,
many interpretations have been struck down in split opinions or
almost struck down by courts.184
There is a general sense that the SEC’s rules govern “procedu-
ral” law, while state law governs “substantive” law.  As indicated
above, this view is an increasingly outmoded view.  Even assuming
this sense is still accurate, “except at the extremes, the terms ‘sub-
stance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little except a di-
chotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is largely
determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”185
A major limit on SEC power came in 1990 in reaction to the
SEC’s rule 19(c)(4), which barred self-regulatory stock exchanges
from diluting the per-share voting power of existing sharehold-
178. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
179. Id. at 842-43.
180. Id. at 843.
181. Id. at 844.
182. See Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982).
183. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (internal quotations
omitted).
184. See U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 586-88 (2d Cir. 1991) (Mahoney, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting eight cases where the SEC interpreta-
tions of its statutory powers were overturned by courts).
185. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
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ers.186  The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule in Business Round-
table v. SEC.187
The Business Roundtable decision held that the SEC had no au-
thority to pass the rule because it directly affected the substantive
allocation of shareholder powers, and thus exceeded the SEC’s
statutory authority under section 19 of the Securities and Exchange
Act.188  The court suggested that SEC rulemaking done under its
implied authority is limited to Congress’s mandate when enacting
the statutes that empower the agency and that Congress was prima-
rily concerned with disclosure.189  Thus, matters that concern only
disclosure are presumably in a “safe harbor.”190
The court acknowledged that there was a gray area between sub-
stance and procedure.  Specifically, the court noted that Rule
14(a)(4)(b)(2) requires companies to provide shareholders with a
means to vote for directors as individuals, thus barring corpora-
tions from “tying” board nominee votes by forcing them to vote for
all or none of their candidates.191
The value of Business Roundtable as precedent is unclear, as the
case may have been decided differently if argued on different
grounds.192  The court itself acknowledged that the SEC may have
authority to enact the controversial rule under section 14(e) of the
Williams Act, but did not reach the issue because the SEC did not
argue it as a basis of authority.193  Since the decision, the Second
Circuit has held that the SEC’s 14(e) rulemaking provision grants
186. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-
4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 565-66 (1991) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Resurrection of SEC
Rule 19c-4 ].
187. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1988); see Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407.
189. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410. The court’s holding seems in tension
with other rules that appear well settled and go well beyond disclosing information.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 14(a)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007) (al-
lowing shareholders the ability to include proposals in companies’ proxy materials in
certain circumstances).
190. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410-11.
191. Id. at 411.
192. Id. at 417. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act gives the SEC rulemaking author-
ity to prevent the use of fraudulent devices to prevent competing bids. See Williams
Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2007); U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 556-64 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding a SEC rule under 14(e) did not violate the SEC mandate even though
it altered fiduciary relationships). But see Bainbridge, Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-
4, supra note 186, at 593 (suggesting that Supreme Court precedent makes an inter- R
pretation of the SEC’s mandate impermissible).
193. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 417.  The Williams Act included amendments
to the SEC’s authority enacted in 1968 primarily to regulate tender offers. See gener-
ally Williams Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
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the SEC the power to regulate beyond the disclosure regime and
into the substantive regulation of fiduciary duties.194
Additionally, the Business Roundtable decision did not create a
limit on the SEC mandate in the sense that it did not prevent the
SEC from achieving its desired result.  Under SEC pressure, the
rule in controversy was enacted by all major stock exchanges
within a few years of the decision.195
Finally, a court may be more reluctant to draw the SEC’s man-
date so narrowly now that Sarbanes-Oxley has preempted state law
relating to certain aspects of executive compensation and has
broadened the SEC’s overall powers.
The Effect of Lack of Clarity on the SEC’s Mandate
on Recent Rulemaking
Recently proposed SEC rules have begun to follow a pattern:
the SEC’s authority to pass a rule is questioned, while proposed
rules are simultaneously criticized as unlikely to reach their stated
purpose.
For example, in December 2004, the SEC released a final rule
that required a much larger number of hedge fund advisors to reg-
ister with the SEC.196  Although the SEC has authority to require
registration of hedge funds under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, the Act had an exemption that allowed fund advisors who
managed fourteen or fewer clients to avoid registration.197  The ex-
emption widely limited the Act’s reach, as a group of investors
could be counted as a single “client” if they were collectively part
of a single investment fund.198  The new rule counted each individ-
ual investor as a “client,” expanding enormously the number of
hedge funds that required registration.199
The hedge fund rule was vacated as exceeding the SEC’s man-
date after a large hedge fund advisor’s legal challenge.200  The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that it was beyond the scope of the SEC’s statu-
tory authority to redefine the meaning of the word “client” to in-
clude all investors because “at best it is counterintuitive to
194. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 556-64. But see Bainbridge, Resurrection of SEC
Rule 19c-4, supra note 186, at 593. R
195. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 620 (2003).
196. Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisors, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See generally Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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characterize the investors in a hedge fund as the ‘clients’ of the
adviser” since the “adviser owes fiduciary duties only to the fund,
not to the fund’s investors.”201  Additionally, the court found the
rule was arbitrary because it would not meet the goal of covering
hedge funds that were national in scope, since the court saw no
necessary link between the number of investors and the amount of
assets of a hedge fund.202
Others suggested the rule would not have achieved its intended
purposes since the SEC may not have had the funding to imple-
ment the rule.  One commentator said of the hedge fund rule:
[T]he commission is not adequately staffed or technologically
equipped to effectively regulate the markets today.  Adding
5,000 hedge funds to its to-do list is a dangerous undertaking.
While it is desirable to have a watchdog, there is no way the staff
of the S.E.C. can do it well–which sets them up for attacks from
state regulators, who tend to uncover fraud and then wonder,
loudly and publicly, what picnic the S.E.C. was enjoying while
investors were swindled.203
Thus, the hedge fund rule was criticized as ineffective and beyond
the scope of the SEC’s mandate.
Another recent example is the proposed SEC stockholder nomi-
nation rule.  This would have required companies to place stock-
holder nominees for directors in company proxy materials in
certain circumstances.204  Two proposed triggering events were: (1)
at least one of a company’s director nominee had over thirty-five
percent “withhold votes” at an annual meeting; or (2) if a share-
holder or group of shareholders holding at least one percent of a
company’s stocks submitted a proposal under Rule 14(a)(8) asking
the company to be subject to the direct access process and the pro-
posal received at least fifty percent of the votes cast at the annual
meeting.205  The SEC claimed that nothing in the proposed rules
established a right of security holders to nominate candidates for
election; rather, the rules would change how the company disclosed
201. Id. at 881.
202. Id. at 883.
203. See Jenny Anderson, A Modest Proposal to Prevent Hedge Fund Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, at C6.
204. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,787 (Oct. 23, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).  The rules can be limited or eliminated
by state law. Id.
205. Id. at 60,789-91.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ307.txt unknown Seq: 29 20-SEP-07 11:01
2007] FED. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS 1139
the nomination by requiring its disclosure through the company’s
proxy statement.206
Commentators have questioned whether the proposed rule will
affect shareholder power as intended because the process would
take two years to implement, and the triggers do not necessarily
relate to problems indicating poor corporate governance.207  They
have also questioned whether the proposed rule is beyond the
SEC’s mandate since it impacts who is eventually elected to
boards.208  In fact, at least one organization has already threatened
to challenge the proposed rule’s legality if it is ever imple-
mented.209  As with the hedge fund rule, the shareholder nomina-
tion proposal was challenged as ineffective and beyond the SEC’s
mandate.
III. THE SEC’S RECENTLY ENACTED EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION RULES
The SEC’s recently enacted executive compensation rules ex-
panding disclosure requirements may not significantly affect com-
pensation since they continue the pattern set out above:  the rules
are arguably beyond the SEC’s mandate and ineffective because
they are overly cautious in an effort to stay within a disclosure re-
gime.210  As a result, the rules do not even address the executive
compensation problems of excessiveness, process, predictability,
and over-regulation that were discussed earlier.211
Overview of the New Rules
The new rules require public companies to provide a single fig-
ure for total compensation including significant perquisites, stock
206. Id. at 60,787.
207. See Tara L. C. Van Ho, Comment, Reconstructing the Marriage of Ownership
and Control:  Is the SEC Missing an Important Step in Its Hesitancy to Adopt Pro-
posed Rule 14A-11?, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1211, 1237 (2005) (questioning whether pro-
posed rule 14(a)(11) will impact shareholder power).
208. Compare Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-totter, 41
CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 411 (2005) (suggesting that the proposed rule is outside the
SEC’s current scope of authority and would not withstand judicial challenge), with
Van Ho, supra note 207, at 1239 (suggesting that the proposed rule is within the SEC’s R
mandate since it is subject to state law and deals only with the mailing of proxy mater-
ials and not internal board mechanics).
209. Phil McCarty, SEC’s Proxy Plan Threatened with Suit by Business Chamber,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A2.
210. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text; see also Cox, supra note 1
(noting the SEC’s desire to stay within its mandate with its new rules).
211. See supra Parts I-II.
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options, and retirement benefits for the chief executive officer, the
chief financial officer, all directors, and three other highest-paid of-
ficers.212  These changes affect company required proxy statements,
as well as annual reports and registration statements.213  The rule
also modifies the current reporting requirements of Form 8-K re-
garding compensation arrangements.214
Prior rules required that companies disclose the compensation of
the chief executive officer and the next four highest-paid execu-
tives in management.  Specifically, the new rule will require com-
panies to disclose the pay, severance, bonus, stock and option
grants, and retirement packages of the chief executive officer, the
chief financial officer, and the next three highest-paid executives.215
The Probable Effectiveness of the Rules
Part I of this Comment described multiple problems relating to
executive compensation including excessiveness of pay, a flawed
pay-setting process, inadequate disclosure, and over-regulation
leading to lack of predictability and inconsistent incentives.  The
enacted rules address the issue of disclosure, but ignore the rest of
these problems.
The SEC’s disclosure theory is that once companies are required
to disclose the extent of pay, investors can make informed deci-
sions, assess the information themselves, and reach their own con-
clusions:  “[it] is [the investors’] job, not the government’s, to
determine how best to align executive compensation with corpora-
tion performance, to determine the appropriate levels of executive
pay, and to decide on the metrics for determining it.”216
While the new rules should be applauded for attempting to fix
the problem of obfuscation of executive pay, shareholder advo-
212. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg.
53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 232, 239, 240, 245, 274).
213. Id.  A proxy statement and annual report are documents public companies are
required to mail to shareholders annually.  The proxies are solicitations of the right to
vote on the shareholder’s behalf at a shareholder meeting.  For a thorough description
of proxies, see BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 471-76. R
214. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg.
53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 232, 239, 240, 245, 274).
215. Id.; see also Press Release No. 2006-123, SEC (July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm.  One part of the new rules as origi-
nally proposed that was not adopted would have required disclosure of up to three
other employees who receive more compensation than any of the top five executives.
See Stephen Labaton & Claudia Deutsch, Look Who Is Making The Most, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at C1.
216. Cox, supra note 1.
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cates have generally agreed with SEC Chairman Cox that the rules
will not create wage controls and have criticized the rules for plac-
ing the burden on shareholders to control compensation without
giving the shareholders effective tools with which to do so.217
Others have suggested that there may be a shaming effect
through disclosure, but the problem with this idea is that “[a]nyone
who isn’t embarrassed to ask for $100 million isn’t embarrassed if it
is disclosed.”218  Accordingly, the rules are not likely to control the
inflation of compensation, and in fact may even raise salaries.219
As one reporter noted:
[I]t won’t be just you and me who are getting a fuller picture of
executive compensation—so will the nation’s chief executives.
And history suggests that whenever they discover a fellow
C.E.O. is getting something they don’t have, they make a grab
for it.  In other words, as laudable as more disclosure is, there is
a real possibility that it will make a bad situation worse.220
Another commentator described the logic behind this effect:
[T]here may sometimes be perverse effects to mandatory disclo-
sure.  My intuition is that disclosure is most effective when it
forces the identification of the laggard—the one whose behavior
is in some recognizable way inferior to his peers in terms of a
consensus about social respectability.  In other words, it helps
induce what sociologists call a “mimetic” process, or in more
pedestrian terms, organizational conformity.  In the compensa-
tion area, however, it may, if anything, have caused companies
to raise compensation faster than it might have otherwise, as
peer payments become more visible and companies want to be
at least competitive and—if they believe their executives are
“special”—supracompetitive.221
Thus, there is significant danger that pay will rise as a result of the
new disclosures.
217. Letter from Les Greenberg, Chairman, Committee of Concerned Sharehold-
ers, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s70306/ccs012706.pdf (noting that proxy contests are very expensive).
218. Deutsch, supra note 31, at C6.
219. See, e.g., Schoen, supra note 155.
220. Nocera, supra note 68, at C1.  This idea was echoed in public comments on the R
rule.  “CEOs may just have more information to get compliant board compensation
committees to help top executives keep up or surpass their peers in a continuing
ratcheting up of compensation at the expense of typical stockholders.” Letter from
Frank C. Inman, Former Professor of Economics and Finance, to SEC Staff (Feb. 7,
2006), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/fcinman3662.htm.
221. Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Ma-
teriality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (1998).
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In sum, the adopted rules may not help compensation problems,
and there is a danger that they will worsen the situation by creating
new bargaining chips for CEOs without creating new controls for
shareholders.  This at least suggests that the executive compensa-
tion problems of inadequate disclosure, substantive unfairness,
process unfairness, and regulatory ineffectiveness are all linked,
and that complementary and consistent regulation governing all of
these elements may be necessary to improve the United States’ sys-
tem of compensating executives.
Authority to Pass the Rules
The adopted rules are likely to pass judicial challenge, as they
function purely through disclosure, which is considered a safe har-
bor under a Business Roundtable analysis.
Nonetheless, there is at least an argument that the rules do go
beyond disclosure.  Consider what the compensation committee’s
engagement in a “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” must
disclose: the objectives of the compensation program, what the
compensation program is designed to reward, each element of the
plan and the choice for the elements, how each element applies,
the role of executive officers in the compensation process, how
benchmarking was used, the dollar amount of post-employment
benefits, such as golden parachutes triggered by a change in con-
trol, and the dollar value of options.222
This list presupposes that corporations and compensation com-
mittees already use these processes and consider these factors in
setting executive compensation, but never disclose their findings to
the public.  Whether this presumption is warranted is far from
clear.  Even if many companies do undergo this process, it is not
due to any current legal requirement.223  To the extent that compa-
nies do not currently consider these factors, the requirement of dis-
closure has the effect of substantive rulemaking.  In order to
disclose, a corporation must either change the way it sets compen-
sation or at least go through the motions to determine data and
222. Press Release, No. 2006-123, supra note 215; see also Executive Compensation R
and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 232, 239, 240, 245, 274).
223. For example, in the Disney case, several members of the compensation com-
mittee had minimal information in front of them, including no information on the
potential dollar value of a no-fault termination clause. See In re Walt Disney, 907
A.2d 693, 753-56 (Del. Ch. 2005) (finding this ignorance did not amount to gross neg-
ligence nor a breach of the duty of care).  Presumably, the new rules effectively man-
date compensation committees to make this information available.
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then actively ignore it.  This may be a good policy, but it may also
extend beyond disclosure by effectively requiring companies to
have certain information before determining compensation.  This is
arguably beyond the SEC’s mandate.  In fact, if the rules do lower
compensation it may be because compensation committees are less
likely to be blindsided by the real cost of a no-fault termination
clause or a stock option plan.
Thus, the focus on disclosure is likely to sufficiently shield the
recent rules from judicial challenge.  Also, the rules are likely
within the SEC’s mandate.  Nevertheless, even if the rules do lower
compensation packages, it may be the result of the rules more sub-
tle encroachment on board operations rather than of investors re-
acting to new information.
IV. FEDERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
The U.S. Congress has at least two options in clarifying the
SEC’s mandate: Congress can interpret the mandate narrowly so
that the SEC has no control over “substantive” corporate govern-
ance standards, or Congress can interpret the mandate broadly to
give the SEC clear control over corporate governance standards.
To improve the U.S. system of regulating executive compensa-
tion, Congress may have to codify a broad interpretation of the
SEC’s mandate.  Although clarifying the SEC’s power as narrow
would add predictability, it is ultimately an inadequate option be-
cause it would largely preserve the status quo.
A Narrow Mandate
To clarify the SEC’s mandate so that it is construed narrowly, at
minimum, Congress would likely need to codify some form of the
Business Roundtable standard of separating disclosure from sub-
stantive law.  Beyond this, it would also need to answer questions
left open by the Business Roundtable decision, including whether
the SEC can “approve” substantive law made by stock exchanges.
The advantage of this clarification is that it provides the least
intrusion on state law, and benefits the SEC and businesses with
the predictable pursuit of the current agenda.
One disadvantage, however, is that this change would not help
solve substantive or procedural problems.  Further, though this
change would be a step forward in clarity and predictability, it may
be that there is no possible bright line rule separating disclosure
and the SEC’s current other functions from substantive governance
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law.  Thus, the best that Congress could tell us is to read the statute
narrowly.
Moreover, the change may do little to cure the current patch-
work of SEC control over corporate governance.  Why should the
SEC regulate remuneration of loans, but not other areas of com-
pensation?  Why should companies that choose to be listed on
stock exchanges be governed by the SEC with a raised eyebrow,
while sizable, unlisted companies can avoid similar scrutiny?
A narrow mandate would also fail to solve the substantive and
process problems currently troubling executive compensation in
the United States.  While it may relieve some of the tension regard-
ing competition for standard setting, the impact is likely to be lim-
ited because the current contradictory regulatory incentives, such
as those surrounding the granting of stock options, would still be in
place.
Moreover, a narrow mandate may actually make the current sys-
tem worse.  The current system allows multiple parties to create
standards that promote regulatory competition and thereby lead to
more efficient results than would result if the SEC’s presence were
removed completely.  For example, the very vagueness of the
SEC’s mandate may create a looming omnipresence over Dela-
ware law, forcing Delaware to be more efficient to avoid federal
preemption.224  Likewise, perhaps state attorney generals create
checks on the SEC by uncovering fraud when the SEC is lax.225
A Broad Mandate
To clarify the SEC’s mandate so that it is construed broadly,
Congress would likely need to codify the SEC’s ability to set mini-
mum corporate governance standards, thus overturning the Busi-
ness Roundtable decision.  This would also give the SEC the ability
to preempt independent actors and state actors.226
224. See Roe, supra note 195, at 603-04 (discussing federal competition’s influence R
on Delaware).
225. See Macey, supra note 145, at 117 (arguing that Spitzer reacted to perceived
SEC laxness).  On the other hand, the lack of clarity is not only omnipresent over
Delaware, it is also omnipresent over corporations that are subject to many masters
with minimal predictability.  Still, this uncertainty may be better than removing the
SEC from the field completely.
226. Congress could also choose to give government funding to a quasi-governmen-
tal standard setter like the FASB, which the SEC would have the power to oversee.
Cf. Williams, supra note 175; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7219 (2006).  Other examples include the United Kingdom’s Financial Service Code
and Combined Code. See generally The Combined Code on Corporate Governance
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Although Congress never embraced it, the idea of federal corpo-
rate governance standards is not new.  Twice in the early twentieth
century there were movements in Congress and the executive
branch to completely federalize corporate law.227  In the late 1970s,
there was a push by an SEC commissioner and prominent mem-
bers of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) to create national
minimum standards, including the requirement of independent
boards and shareholder rights to vote on more issues.228
While this affects the balance of federalism, this is an area upon
which  federal law has already encroached.229  As described above,
there are already numerous ways for the SEC to directly and indi-
rectly regulate substantive corporate governance, although the cur-
rent uncertainty surrounding the SEC’s mandate often leads to
ineffective governance of executive compensation.  Thus, congres-
sional endorsement would allow the SEC to continue what it has
already been attempting to do, while encouraging it to do so more
effectively and without the danger of legal challenge.
Definitive governance standards would help every party in the
corporate structure.  Boards would know what rules they must fol-
low and shareholders would have clearer standards for measuring
their boards.  For example, as noted above, in selecting an “inde-
pendent” director at present, a board is likely, at minimum, to look
at standards set by the SEC, the IRS, the NYSE, ISS, and possibly
one or two key institutional shareholders.  If the SEC created one
single standard, even if it were not perfect, only one authoritative
source would exist.  Even those who believe that the free market
effectively checks compensation may find this appealing because it
would relieve pressure to follow interest group standards that may
have no empirical basis.  Also, there may be an overall lower regu-
latory burden since boards are currently pressured to follow the
most extreme parts of all the regulators’ definitions.
Clarification of the SEC’s mandate to include standard-setting
would also give Congress an opportunity to effectively fund the
(July 2003), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf (presenting non-
binding guidelines where a company must explain a choice not to follow advice).
227. Roe, supra note 195, at 603-04; Cary, supra note 42, at 670-71. R
228. Cary, supra note 42, at 670-71.
229. See Roe, supra note 195, at 603-04.  The SEC could arguably create non-bind- R
ing standards for corporate governance under its current disclosure regime without
violating its mandate.  For example, the SEC could enact rules that required compa-
nies to disclose whether they use a specific definition of “independent director” and if
not, to explain why.  Such a requirement, however, would run the danger of adding
another standard-setter to the corporate governance equation without eliminating
other standard-setters.
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SEC’s pursuit.  This clarification would help uncover market fail-
ures, and remove the danger of over-regulation and over-emphasis
on areas of unproven corporate governance.230  The change would
be particularly desirable because in many recent cases, the burden
of showing the economic wisdom and effectiveness of proposed re-
forms has been placed on the private sector.231
Finally, and most important, this broad clarification of the SEC’s
mandate is the only solution with a high probability of fixing the
many executive compensation problems set out in Part I of this
Comment.  As noted above, current executive compensation
problems are linked, which makes predictable, consistent regula-
tion governing all of these elements necessary to improve the U.S.
system of compensating executives.
An increase in the SEC power to regulate substantive corporate
governance would eliminate much of the regulatory confusion de-
scribed above.  It would also allow the SEC to tailor regulations to
simultaneously reach substantive, disclosure, and process matters.
This would eliminate current contradictory incentives and allow for
the meaningful changes that are unlikely to result from the SEC’s
recently proposed disclosure-based rules.
CONCLUSION
The SEC’s recently proposed rules do not extend far enough to
regulate executive compensation and may only lead to a further
escalation of salaries.  If Congress is serious about fixing the sys-
tem, it must also address the process by which compensation is set.
To accomplish this, the best option is to expand the Commission’s
mandate so it can act as a corporate governance standard setter, as
well as perform research and economic analysis, which will ulti-
mately benefit the market and shareholders.
230. The research resulting from the SEC’s standard-setting position could be per-
formed similarly to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Bureau of Economics,
which assists the FTC’s antitrust and consumer protection activities through providing
economic support and analysis of potential agency actions. See Fed. Trade Comm’n
Home Page, http://www.ftc.gov/be/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
231. The new rules are an example. See Executive Compensation and Related Per-
son Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
228-29, 232, 239, 240, 245, 274). Another example is the recent shareholder director
proposal. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,787 (Oct. 23,
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).  There is a danger in this reli-
ance.  Currently, ISS has the incentive to overstate the need for governance, while
pro-management organizations have the opposite incentive.  This situation has meant
that currently held information regarding executive compensation is potentially
biased.
